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PROVIDE IMPARTIAL JURIES FOR 
RURAL ALASKANS 
JEFF D. MAY* 
ABSTRACT 
In Alvarado v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court declared that an impartial 
jury is a cross section of the community and that the community where the 
events at issue transpired must be represented in the jury. This decision 
spurred changes to jury selection procedures and the creation of Criminal 
Rule 18, an effort to ensure defendants from remote villages are judged by a 
jury representative of these rural areas. The Alaska Court of Appeals recently 
addressed an issue of first impression regarding the application of Criminal 
Rule 18. In Joseph v. State, the defendant was convicted of murdering his 
girlfriend in the tiny Native village of Rampart. His trial was conducted in 
Fairbanks by a jury selected from an area that does not include Rampart or 
any other similar Native village. Criminal Rule 18 allowed the defendant a 
limited time to transfer his trial to Nenana, which more closely resembles the 
characteristics of Rampart. However, the defendant was never informed of 
this right. His trial counsel believed trial location was a decision for the 
attorney and did not see a need to request the change. In a memorandum 
opinion that creates no binding precedent, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
this view and held it did not violate the defendant’s due process rights not to 
be informed of the opportunity to have his case heard at an alternative trial 
site. This Article challenges that view, arguing it fails to safeguard the spirit 
and purpose of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. To remote 
villagers in Bush Alaska whose customs, culture, and ways of life are vastly 
different than in larger cities within the state, the opportunity to be judged by 
those sharing similarities is of upmost importance. Consequently, decisions of 
trial venue, for purposes of Criminal Rule 18, should be knowingly made or 
waived by the defendant. 
 
* J.D. University of Montana, 2008; M.A. in Justice Administration, University of 
Alaska Fairbanks, 2007. The author currently works as an Assistant Professor in 
the Justice Department at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alaska is enormous. The state consists of 571,951 square miles, 
making its size roughly equivalent to one-fifth of the lower forty-eight 
states.1 The population of this immense area is unevenly distributed. 
Nearly one-half of Alaska’s total population lives in the City of 
Anchorage,2 and there are only a handful of other “large” cities, such as 
Fairbanks (population 31,142) and Juneau (population 30,737).3 Most of 
the remaining population is scattered throughout small communities, 
including approximately 200 Native villages known collectively as “the 
Bush” or “Bush villages.” Bush villages share common characteristics 
such as remoteness, no connection to a road system, predominantly 
Native populations, and different modes of life than larger urban centers 
within the state.4 More than half of Alaska’s total Native population is 
located in these remote Bush villages.5 
 
 1.  State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:22 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html. 
 2.  Id. Census statistics for 2010 indicate Alaska’s total population is 710,231 
and that, in 2006, 278,700 of these residents lived within the City of Anchorage. 
Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See Devon Knowles, Note, From Chicken to Chignik: The Search for Jury 
Impartiality in Rural Alaska Native Communities, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 
246–47 (2005); see also Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 899–900 (Alaska 1971) 
(discussing life in rural Alaska Native villages). 
 5. Demographic and Geographic Sketches of Alaska Natives, ALASKA NATIVES 
COMMISSION, http://www.alaskool.org/resources/anc/anc07.htm (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2011). In 1990, 61% of the state’s total Native population was spread 
among these Bush villages. Census areas with one-half or more Alaska Native 
populations included the Bethel Census Area (84%), Dillingham Census Area 
(73%), Lake and Peninsula Borough (76%), Nome Census Area (74%), North 
Slope Borough (73%), Northwest Arctic Borough (85%), Wade Hampton Census 
Area (93%), and Yukon-Koyukuk Census Area (56%). Id. Other census areas 
with relatively high percentages of Alaska Native populations included Aleutian 
Islands East, Bristol Bay Borough, Prince of Wales-Outer Ketchikan, Sitka 
Borough, and Skagway-Yakutat-Angoon. Id. 2010 census statistics for these same 
areas indicate the following approximate Native populations: the Bethel Census 
Area (83%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 
PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02050.html, Dillingham Census 
Area (72%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 
PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02070.html, Lake and Peninsula 
Borough (72%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 
3:24 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02164, Nome Census Area 
(76%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02180, North Slope Borough (54%), 
State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02185, Northwest Arctic Borough 
(81%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02188, Wade Hampton Census Area 
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While making Alaska wonderfully unique, these same 
characteristics create logistical and administrative challenges for 
assembling representative juries. Court facilities are generally located in 
more populous communities, and persons residing close to those 
facilities serve as jurors.6 Because Bush villages are not connected to 
outside communities by a road system, it is difficult to involve their 
citizens in regular jury service. When serious crimes occur in these 
remote villages, the common practice is to arrest and transport suspects 
into the larger cities to be detained, arraigned, held in pre-trial detention 
if bail is not possible, and tried at a district or superior court in front of a 
jury selected from within fifty miles of that trial site.7 Therefore, for 
crimes that occur in Bush areas, it is often difficult to empanel 
representative trial juries.8 
Since the early days of the Alaska Court System, parties have 
challenged the procedures used to select prospective jurors for these 
urban trials, arguing they are exclusive of important segments of the 
populace and fail to collect a fair representation of the rural 
communities.9 Early challenges were unsuccessful.10 But, the reality of 
the “enormous gulf which separates the mode of life of the typical 
Alaskan villager from the type of existence led by most residents of 
Anchorage and other cities of the State” led the Alaska Supreme Court 
in Alvarado v. State to announce that for a jury to be truly impartial, it 
must be selected from a group of persons who represent a fair cross 
 
(95%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 PM), 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02270, and Yukon-Koyukuk Census 
Area (71%), State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 3, 2011, 3:24 
PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02290. For another analysis, see 
Knowles, supra note 4, at 246 & n.60. 
 6.  See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18; ALASKA RULES OF ADMIN. 15(b)(2); Alaska 
Venue Map, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/venuemapinfo.htm. 
 7.  See ALASKA RULES OF ADMIN. 15(b)(2); Alaska Venue Map, ALASKA COURT 
SYSTEM (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.state.ak.us/courts/venuemapinfo.htm; 
Rachel King, Bush Justice: The Intersection of Alaska Natives and the Criminal Justice 
System in Rural Alaska, 77 OR. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998); Knowles, supra note 4, at 247; 
see also About the Alaska Court System, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ctinfo.htm (describing the operations of the 
Alaska Court System). The Alaska Court System operates at a regional rather 
than local level. Knowles, supra note 4, at 247. There are several rural magistrates 
operating at the district court level serving in some of village areas, but they 
conduct only misdemeanor trials. Id. 
 8.  See King, supra note 7, at 36–38. 
 9.  See, e.g., Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 892–93; Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 
331–36 (Alaska 1970); Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994, 997 (Alaska 1969); Crawford 
v. State, 408 P.2d 1002, 1003–05 (Alaska 1965). 
 10.  See, e.g., Bachner, 479 P.2d at 319; Green, 462 P.2d at 997; Crawford, 408 
P.2d at 1002. 
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section of the community where the events at issue transpired.11 This 
holding spurred the creation of procedures better calculated to assemble 
impartial juries. 
Jury selection procedures have changed since Alvarado, but not all 
rural defendants are afforded trial juries representative of their area.12 
The State seeks to avoid systematic exclusion13 of remote villages 
through application of Alaska Criminal Rule 18, which is an effort to 
comply with Alvarado by providing a mechanism for defendants from 
remote communities to obtain sufficiently representative juries.14 The 
Rule creates several trial site alternatives but places the responsibility for 
ensuring jury representativeness onto individual defendants. 
Defendants must affirmatively request a venue change from the 
presumptive court location to an alternative trial site, if one is available, 
closer to the place where the crime was committed.15 This must be done 
within ten days of arraignment or the right is waived.16 If the requested 
change in venue cannot produce a sufficiently representative jury, the 
Rule also allows the defendant to request alternative selection 
procedures, such as broadening the selection area to take in persons who 
are likely to share more characteristics of those living in the area where 
the crime occurred.17 
This Article addresses a fundamental flaw in the way Criminal 
Rule 18 is presently administered, which precludes it from fully 
honoring the fundamental trial right to an impartial jury announced so 
vigorously in Alvarado. As noted above, if the defendant does not 
request an alternative trial site or the use of alternative selection 
 
 11.  Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 899, 902. 
 12.  See Knowles, supra note 4, at 249–51, 254–57 (discussing changes in the 
jury selection procedures since Alvarado and arguing that the procedures still 
amount to systematic exclusion of many Alaskan Native communities); see also 
King, supra note 7, at 36–38 (providing an excellent example of how using the 
fifty-mile jury selection radius for trials in Ketchikan still results in 
underrepresentation of specific Native groups not living within that area). 
 13.  Systematic exclusion of certain identifiable groups in the community is 
unconstitutional. Tugatuk v. State, 626 P.2d 95, 100 (Alaska 1981) (adopting the 
three part test announced in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). 
Proving systematic exclusion requires showing: “(1) that the group alleged to be 
excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of 
this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in 
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this 
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury 
selection process.” Id. (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). 
 14.  John v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 54–56 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 15.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(b), (e). 
 16.  Id. 18(e). 
 17.  Id. 18(f). 
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procedures within ten days of arraignment, the options are waived.18 
The fundamental flaw is the failure of the Alaska Court System to 
ensure that this waiver is knowing and intelligent. Because an impartial 
jury is a fundamental constitutional trial right19 and because the Alaska 
Supreme Court has recognized that this cannot be achieved unless the 
community where the crime occurred is fairly represented in the jury 
pool,20 the Alaska Court System should ensure that defendants are 
apprised of their Rule 18 rights prior to accepting a waiver of those 
rights.  
As it is presently applied, Criminal Rule 18 does not treat the right 
to request a change of venue as a personal right of the defendant. 
Rather, change of venue for jury composition purposes is a trial decision 
left to defense counsel.21 The Alaska Court System should make the 
right to an impartial jury personal to the defendant by ensuring the 
defendant is informed of this right prior to any waiver of it in order to 
fully honor the defendant’s jury trial rights.  
Part I provides an overview of the fundamental elements of a 
criminal jury and discusses the requirement for and importance of a 
representative jury for rural Alaskans. Part II describes several pre-
Alvarado jury selection practices and Alaska Supreme Court decisions 
regarding jury representativeness and impartiality. These cases 
demonstrate the early court’s narrow view regarding jury 
representativeness. Part III discusses the 1971 landmark22 decision 
issued by the Alaska Supreme Court in Alvarado v. State, requiring an 
increase in jury representativeness for rural defendants despite cost or 
administrative burden. Part IV discusses the State’s efforts to bring the 
jury selection process in harmony with Alvarado. Part V highlights the 
deficiency in the application of Criminal Rule 18’s waiver provision 
noted above. Lastly, Part VI suggests how Criminal Rule 18 can be 
improved so as to provide greater fidelity to the constitutional guarantee 
of an impartial jury. 
 
 18.  Id. 18(e). 
 19.  Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994, 997 (Alaska 1969) (citing Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 84−85 (1942)). 
 20.  Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 899, 902 (Alaska 1971). 
 21.  See Joseph v. State, No. A-9675, 2011 WL 182048 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 19, 
2011) (memorandum opinion). In this instance, the unpublished decision is 
representative of the current view of the Alaska Court of Appeals regarding the 
issue. 
 22.  See Stickman-Sam v. State, 135 P.3d 1041, 1042 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) 
(reviewing the holding of Alvarado and referring to it as a “landmark” decision). 
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I. FUNDAMENTALS OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL: VENUE, VICINAGE, 
AND IMPARTIALITY 
A discussion of venue and jury selection for Alaskan trials should 
begin with a brief review of the role of a jury in criminal trials. In early 
Anglo-Saxon law a jury of the defendant’s peers referred to a group of 
persons known as “compurgators,” who were summoned to bear 
witness to facts.23 These persons were selected because of their 
familiarity with either the crime or the character of the accused.24 They 
testified under oath about the criminal activity and the defendant’s 
character.25 In this system, the jury played a role similar to the role of 
witnesses in today’s criminal trials. Over time, the jury system evolved, 
and jurors went from serving as witnesses to deciding the defendant’s 
guilt or innocence based on evidence presented by others more familiar 
with the case.26 Jurors were expected to judge the facts impartially but 
not to have direct knowledge of the case.27 
“As the jury’s role changed, so did the rationale for drawing jurors 
from the defendant’s community.”28 When jurors acted as witnesses, 
they were usually persons living in the community where the crime 
occurred because they had knowledge of the facts of the case.29 When 
the jury’s role changed to that of a neutral fact-finder, this rationale no 
longer applied.30 Instead, the rationale for drawing jurors from the place 
where the crime occurred was to ensure the jurors were persons who 
could accurately express the opinions of the community most impacted 
by the offense.31 
 
 23.  Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1546 (1993). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 1547. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. Professor Levenson argues that the Constitution does not describe 
the role of the American criminal jury. Id. at 1548. To understand that role, she 
refers to the meaning attributed to the juror’s role at the time of the inception of 
our country. Id. Levenson explains: 
[T]he colonists clung to a notion of a ‘jury of one’s peers’ as a vehicle 
for infusing revolutionary, democratic ideals into the American 
criminal justice system. . . . Each verdict was a means for the 
community . . . to vote on the fairness of a particular prosecution. . . . 
[The jury was] an instrument for the protection of individual liberty 
and a representative of the community’s beliefs.  
Id. at 1548–49. 
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While the role of the jury has changed, three important elements 
have remained: the requirements of venue, vicinage, and impartiality. 
Criminal defendants have constitutional rights to a trial in the proper 
venue32 by an impartial jury33 selected from the proper vicinage.34 
A. Venue and Vicinage 
The venue and vicinage provisions of the United States 
Constitution reflect the democratic nature of the jury’s role.35 Venue 
refers to the location of the trial.36 Article III of the United States 
Constitution requires that a criminal trial be held in the state where the 
crime was committed.37 Vicinage refers to the location from which the 
members of the jury are selected.38 The Sixth Amendment requires that 
the criminal jury be selected from the state and district where the crime 
was committed.39 In Duncan v. Louisiana,40 the United States Supreme 
Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
against the states.41 Thus, Alaska law follows this vicinage 
requirement.42 
Venue offers potential benefits to defendants, such as being known 
by the prosecution (if in fact that is favorable), having friends and 
relatives close at hand for legal and moral support, and having 
knowledge of the jurors, which allows defendants to intelligently 
challenge their participation.43 The venue requirement also benefits the 
community by emphasizing the “local” nature of crime.44 The 
community is given a voice in the resolution of a matter which impacts 
 
 32.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 33.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Levenson, supra note 23, at 1549. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 38.  Levenson, supra note 23, at 1549. 
 39.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This vicinage requirement was a response to the 
British practice of transporting colonists back to England for trial.  See Drew L. 
Kershen, Vicinage, OKLA. L. REV. 801, 806, 814–815 (1976). This practice also 
assured that jurors knew something of the defendant’s status in the community. 
See id. at 808. 
 40.  391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 41.  Id. at 156. 
 42.  See Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651, 656 (Alaska Ct. App. 1980) (discussing 
the general rule that jury selection should be commenced in the venue where the 
crime occurred and moved only if voir dire reveals the need to do so); see also 
Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 902 (Alaska 1971). 
 43.  Kershen, supra note 39, at 808. 
 44.  See id. at 811. 
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it. This voice acts as the community’s conscience and establishes 
communal standards.45 According to Professor Levenson: 
The criminal jury ensures that the verdict comports not only 
with objective criteria of the law but also with the very real 
sense of justice that both the community and defendant must 
share for the jury system to continue as an acceptable means of 
resolving disputes. 
. . . .  
. . . [Because] the aggrieved community has an interest in the 
outcome of the case, the community should have some type of 
representation in the body that decides the case. Choosing 
jurors with some relation to the community most affected by 
the crime ensures that this representation will be present and 
makes it more likely that the verdict will be accepted by the 
community that must live with its consequences.46 
The drafters of the Constitution expected that a crime would 
normally occur near the defendant’s residence, but if it did not, the 
location of the crime was deemed the appropriate venue.47 Similarly, the 
drafters did not use the defendant’s residence to determine vicinage; 
rather, the source of the jurors was the “‘district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed.’”48 Both venue and vicinage promote the jury 
functions of “finding the facts, applying the law to the facts, and serving 
as the conscience of the community.”49 
In Alaska, a defendant can waive the right to venue and vicinage 
and have his case tried in a different location under appropriate 
circumstances.50 Generally, this requires showing that the ability to have 
a fair trial in the district where the crime occurred has been 
jeopardized.51 The defendant has a constitutional right to a change of 
 
 45.  Levenson, supra note 23, at 1551–52. 
 46.  Id. at 1552, 1558. Professor Levenson also notes that while common 
criminal jury instructions contain applicable law and general instructions, the 
instructions are also intentionally vague and incorporate within them a 
community standard of acceptableness. Id. at 1552–56. 
 47.  Kershen, supra note 39, at 811. 
 48.  Levenson, supra note 23, at 1550 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). 
 49.  Id.; see also Kershen, supra note 39, at 833 (“Both proponents and 
opponents understood that a jury of the vicinage would be different from a jury 
from anywhere else with respect to each of the three major functions performed 
by a jury: finding the facts; applying the law to the facts; and serving as the 
conscience of the community.”). 
 50.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(b)(3). This rule allows either party to request a 
change of venue. Id. 
 51.  See ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.040(1) (2010) (allowing the court to change 
venue “when there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had”); 
Levenson, supra note 23, at 1539. 
MAY.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:40 PM 
2011 IMPARTIAL JURIES FOR RURAL ALASKANS 253 
venue if he can show that there is a “reasonable likelihood” of prejudice 
to his right to a fair trial.52 Excessive prejudice warranting a change of 
venue can arise from pretrial publicity or a hostile courtroom 
atmosphere.53 Alaska’s geography and statutory rights add additional 
justifications for a change of venue. For example, venue change has 
occurred through the use of the statutory right to preempt the assigned 
trial judge.54 Also, as discussed in greater detail in Part IV, it is allowed 
as a matter of right through Criminal Rule 18 when there is a suitable 
trial site closer to the location of the crime.55 
B. Jury Impartiality 
Venue and vicinage are interconnected with concerns about jury 
impartiality. The Alaska and United States Constitutions guarantee 
defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury.56 There are two 
components of an impartial jury. The first is the need for jurors not to be 
unduly influenced by their personal knowledge of the facts or parties 
 
 52.  Levenson, supra note 23, at 1540 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 
333, 363 (1966)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 codifies this standard. Id. 
“[I]f the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in 
the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial 
there,” the court shall move the trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). The rule also states 
that “the court may transfer the proceeding, or one or more counts, against [the] 
defendant to another district for the convenience of the parties, any victim, and 
the witnesses, and in the interest of justice.” Id. 21(b). For Alaska’s rules, see 
ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.040(1) (2010) and ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18. 
 53.  See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800–03 (1975); Norris v. Risley, 918 
F.2d 828, 831–32 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant was prejudiced by 
spectators wearing buttons inscribed “Women Against Rape” at his trial for 
kidnapping and rape); Wylie v. State, 797 P.2d 651, 656 (Alaska Ct. App. 1980) 
(recognizing that venue may be changed because of prejudicial pre-trial 
publicity). 
 54.  See, e.g., Tugatuk v. State, 626 P.2d 95, 100 (Alaska 1981). Tugatuk was 
tried and convicted for multiple counts of murder in an Anchorage court for a 
crime committed in the Eskimo village of Aleknagik. Id. at 97. The trial was 
originally assigned to Dillingham, the presumptive trial site for felonies in 
Aleknagik. Id. However, because Tugatuk used his peremptory challenge of the 
trial judge his trial was moved to Anchorage. Id. at 100. The court concluded that 
Tugatuk’s peremptory challenge required the removal of the case to Anchorage, 
which waived his right to have his trial jury be a fair cross section of Aleknagik. 
Id. at 103. However, Tugatuk was still allowed to argue that “given the fact he 
lived in a rural village which was the setting of the crime, a fair cross section of 
the community for a trial held in Anchorage must include ample representation 
of the rural Alaskan lifestyle discussed in Alvarado.” Id. at 100. 
 55.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18. 
 56.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ALASKA CONST. art I, § 11. 
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involved in the dispute.57 If a jury is too familiar with a party or the facts 
of a particular dispute, its decision may be prejudiced.58 The second 
component is the need for the jury to be representative of the 
community where the events transpired, which is a concept embedded 
in our traditional democratic society and representative government.59 
These two components must be balanced because of their inherent 
tension. A jury made up of residents of the location of the crime meets 
the cross-section requirement, but it is more likely to be prejudiced by 
personal knowledge of the facts or by relation to a party. If residents 
outside of the location of the crime decide the facts, the level of 
representativeness decreases, but so does the likelihood of personal 
familiarity with the case. Balancing these competing interests is difficult 
in rural Alaska.60 Ideally, the court should start by trying to find persons 
who are part of the community where events occurred and who are not 
so influenced, and expand out from there only as needed.61 A trial judge 
has discretion to determine what efforts to take to obtain an impartial 
jury in a rural area, and his decision will be upheld if the record shows 
he weighed different possibilities and made a reasonable effort to obtain 
an impartial jury.62 
Much has been written about jury composition and its impacts on 
impartiality.63 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
 
 57.  Lestenkof v. State, 229 P.3d 182, 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing 
Oxereok v. State, 611 P.2d 913, 918–19 (Alaska 1980)); see also Minch v. State, 934 
P.2d 764, 769 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). Under Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 
24(c), a prospective juror should not serve if they have opinions which would 
improperly influence their verdict. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(c). 
 58.  Titus v. State, 963 P.2d 258, 262 (Alaska 1998). 
 59.  Id. at 262–63 (citing Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 902–03 (Alaska 
1971)); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84–85 (1942); Green v. State, 
462 P.2d 994, 996–97 (Alaska 1969). 
 60.  See, e.g., Lestenkof v. State, 229 P.3d 182, 185–86 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010) 
(discussing the challenge of a trial court’s efforts to select a suitable jury on St. 
Paul Island). 
 61.  See id. (explaining how the trial judge began with extensive efforts to 
find jurors from St. Paul); see also Calantas v. State, 599 P.2d 147, 149–50 (Alaska 
1979) (upholding the trial court’s decision to supplement the jury venire with 
additional names from the master jury list because it was apparent too few 
jurors would be available for trial in Kodiak). 
 62.  Lestenkof, 229 P.3d at 185 (citing Erick v. State, 642 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1982)). 
 63.  See, e.g., King, supra note 7, at 38 & n.135 (citing Deborah Zalesne & 
Kinney Zalesne, Saving the Peremptory Challenge: The Case for a Narrow 
Interpretation of McCollum, 70 DENVER L. REV. 313 (1993); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury 
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory 
Challenge Should be Abolished, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 369 (1992); Douglas L. Colbert, 
Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial 
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that jury composition can have radical impacts on verdicts.64 There is a 
tendency to empathize with or subconsciously favor members of one’s 
own race,65 and some research goes so far as to suggest jurors tend to 
convict defendants of other races more readily than their own.66 
Communication barriers and difficulties understanding witnesses from 
other cultures also influence jury decisions.67  
These concerns are very real for Alaska Native defendants, and 
they are exacerbated when racial and cultural differences are combined 
with lifestyle differences between urban and rural areas. Many Alaska 
Natives speak English, but this does not mean they express themselves 
or interpret information in the same way as the dominant Anglo culture 
of Alaska’s urban areas. Several of these differences are documented in a 
law review article written by Rachel King, a former public defender who 
worked with many rural Alaska Native clients.68 For example, many 
Alaska Natives believe it disrespectful to make eye contact when 
speaking and thus communicate in non-confrontational ways.69 Instead 
of interpreting these as signs of respectful communication, many non-
Natives misattribute these behaviors as suspicious, non-cooperative, or 
 
Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990); Barbara D. 
Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, 
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992)). 
 64.  See King, supra note 7, at 36 n.127 (“It is well known that prejudices often 
exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of 
jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those 
classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy.” (quoting 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879))). 
 65.  Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the 
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 78 (1993) [hereinafter 
Nancy King] (citing Marilyn B. Brewer, In-group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup 
Situation: a Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979)). Rachel 
King notes that this phenomenon is referred to as “[r]acial bias, racial 
stereotyping, ethnocentrism, and ‘in group’ bias.” King, supra note 7, at 38. 
 66.  See, e.g., Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1611, 1640 (1985). 
 67.  Nancy King, supra note 65, at 79. 
 68.  King, supra note 7, at 10–13 (citing Evangeline Marlos Varonis & Susan 
M. Gass, Miscommunication in Native/Nonnative conversation, 14 LANGUAGE & SOC. 
327, 343 (1985)). King writes: 
The less interlocutors know about each another, the more likely they 
are to misunderstand each other on a linguistic, social, or cultural level. 
Such misunderstandings are particularly pronounced between native 
and nonnative speakers of a language; they may have radically 
different customs, modes of interacting, notions of appropriateness, 
and, of course, linguistic systems. 
Id. at 11 (citing Evangeline Marlos Varonis & Susan M. Gass, Miscommunication 
in Native/Nonnative conversation, 14 LANGUAGE & SOC. 327, 343 (1985)). 
 69.  Id. at 10. 
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even evasive.70 Rachel King highlights some of these different 
communication beliefs by referring to the communication research of 
others regarding Alaska Natives and non-Natives.71 This research 
identifies three main areas where there are “substantial differences in 
communication style: the presentation of self, the distribution of talk, 
and the contents of talk.”72 These cultural and communication barriers 
may not be readily apparent to judges, attorneys, or jurors, even when 
they are trying to be as fair and impartial as possible.73 The Alaska 
Supreme Court has long recognized the validity of these concerns.74 As 
Rachel King states, Alaska Native defendants “are less likely to be tried 
by a jury of their peers and [are] more likely to be convicted as a 
result.”75 
The United States and Alaska Constitutions require trials to be held 
in the proper venue and judged by impartial jurors selected from the 
proper vicinage. These concepts are interrelated, and criminal appeals 
involving them have surfaced from Alaska statehood to the present 
time.  
II. PRE-ALVARADO JURY CHALLENGES 
Early challenges to jury selection procedures focused on systematic 
exclusion of certain identifiable groups and the lack of accurate 
representation of the community. Both claims are related and allege a 
lack of impartiality, which is ensured by both the United States and 
Alaska Constitutions.76 Decisions discussing systematic exclusion of 
specific groups focused on intentional and total exclusion.77 Decisions 
discussing community representativeness focused on the 
representativeness of the area where the trial was conducted or the 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See id. at 19 (commenting on Ron and Suzanne Scollon’s research on 
communication differences between “gatekeepers” and Alaska Natives, 
particularly focusing on Athabaskans). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 900–01 (Alaska 1971). 
 75.  King, supra note 7, at 39. 
 76.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ALASKA CONST. art I, § 11. 
 77.  See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 408 P.2d 1002, 1007–10 (Alaska 1965). The 
court reviewed federal decisions regarding systematic exclusion and held that 
the use of a fifteen-mile radius around Anchorage as a selection area did not 
amount to systematic exclusion. Id. There was no showing of intentional effort to 
exclude members of the defendant’s class, and some of each of the various 
segments of the judicial district’s population could be found there. Id. at 1010. 
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entire judicial district rather than the specific community where the 
crime occurred.78 
In Crawford v. State, the defendant claimed that jury selection 
procedures violated his equal protection rights because they excluded 
certain segments of the population, such as Alaska Natives, oil field 
workers, and commercial fisherman.79 Crawford was indicted by a 
grand jury made up of persons living within fifteen miles of the City of 
Anchorage. He challenged the practice of only summoning potential 
jurors for Anchorage-based trials if those jurors resided within a fifteen-
mile radius of the city.80 Specifically, Crawford argued this practice 
systematically and arbitrarily excluded specific groups of the Third 
Judicial District’s population without independently addressing 
whether it was too costly or burdensome for members of these groups 
living outside the fifteen-mile radius to serve as potential jurors.81 
In its decision, the Alaska Supreme Court discussed the history of 
jury selection procedures used in the Third Judicial District. The 
Legislature delegated authority to the superior courts in each judicial 
district to establish jury selection procedures for their respective areas, 
and it instructed them to create procedures that did result in a “large 
and unnecessary expense.”82 After the creation of the Alaska Court 
System in 1960, the presiding judge for the Third Judicial District 
instituted the practice of summoning jurors from all areas within the 
district served by highway or by reasonably regular air service.83 After 
two years, this practice was abandoned for one that only summoned 
persons living within fifteen miles of Anchorage.84 The presiding judge 
responsible for the change believed the former practice too expensive 
because of transportation and per diem costs.85 Additionally, he felt that 
the prior practice was unnecessary because approximately 70% of the 
district’s population lived within fifteen miles of Anchorage, and this 
group of persons “included most, if not all, racial, economic, 
occupational and religious groups” found inside the district.86 
The court found no problem with limiting potential jury service in 
Anchorage trial courts to those residing within fifteen miles of the city 
because “some of each class of . . . persons reside within the Anchorage 
 
 78.  See, e.g., Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994, 997 (Alaska 1969). 
 79.  408 P.2d at 1004, 1007. 
 80.  Id. at 1004. 
 81.  Id. at 1004–05. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 1004. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 1005. 
 86.  Id. 
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area and are eligible for jury service.”87 The court acknowledged there 
may be greater numbers of certain identifiable groups outside the 
fifteen-mile radius, but it focused on whether the practice amounted to 
total exclusion of various distinct groups of persons living within the 
district. So long as the selection area included some level of representation 
of the various “economic, social, religious, racial, political, and 
geographical groups found in the Third District,” the court held it 
provided a fair cross section of the district.88 
This holding was followed five years later in Bachner v. Pearson, 
which examined the Fourth Judicial District’s use of a similar fifteen-
mile limit for trials conducted in Fairbanks.89 Bachner was a civil lawsuit 
arising out of an airplane crash near Fairbanks that was being tried 
before a jury in Fairbanks. Court policy within the Fourth Judicial 
District restricted prospective jurors to persons residing within fifteen 
miles of Fairbanks. This policy was challenged as unconstitutionally 
excluding specific social, racial, and economic groups from jury panels 
within the district.90 The plaintiffs argued this policy denied them a fair 
trial by an impartial jury, but they made no specific showing that this 
geographical limit was detrimental to them. The plaintiffs provided no 
evidence that certain social, racial, or economic groups were excluded 
from jury panels within the district.91 Because of this lack of evidence 
and because such a geographical limit for jury service previously had 
been upheld in Crawford, this constitutional challenge was 
unsuccessful.92 
In 1969 in Green v. State, a related, yet distinctively different, 
challenge was raised by several defendants indicted for kidnapping.93 In 
Green, the Anchorage Superior Court’s use of the limited fifteen-mile 
radius was not challenged. Instead, the defendants claimed they were 
entitled to a jury selected by the newly revised statutory selection 
procedure that increased the representativeness of the jury pool by 
using names from voter registration lists, lists of those who had 
purchased hunting and fishing licenses, and lists of those who had filed 
 
 87.  Id. at 1009. The Court noted that systematic exclusion of persons of the 
defendant’s class is unlawful. Id. at 1007 (citing Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 
584, 585–89 (1958)). 
 88.  Id. at 1010. 
 89.  479 P.2d 319, 332–33 (Alaska 1970). 
 90.  Id. at 331–32. 
 91.  Id. at 332. 
 92.  Id. at 332–33 (citing Crawford, 408 P.2d at 1002). 
 93.  Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994, 996 (Alaska 1969). 
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income tax returns. The prior statutory procedure, and the one used in 
their case, only used those whose names were on voter lists.94 
In response, the court recognized that both the Alaska and United 
States Constitutions guaranteed the defendants the fundamental right to 
be tried by an impartial jury95 and that an impartial jury is one that truly 
represents the community, a concept that is embedded in our 
democratic society and representative government.96 The court also 
referenced decisions holding it unlawful to select juries in ways that 
systematically and intentionally exclude a “particular economic, social, 
religious, racial, political, or geographical” segment of the community.97 
Jury selection practices are constitutional “if prospective jurors are 
drawn from a fair cross section of the community.”98 
In deciding whether the voter lists provided sufficient 
representativeness of the community, the court focused on the 
community where the trial was to be conducted.99 While the revised 
statute may have been meant to increase the representativeness of all 
segments of the community, the use of the voter lists did not lack the 
ability to provide a fair cross section nor was it an intentional effort to 
exclude a cognizable group of the community from jury service.100 The 
court held that the practice of using only the voter lists did not 
systematically exclude a class of persons of which the defendants were 
members.101 
These early cases emphasize two core principles safeguarded by 
the United States and Alaska Constitutions regarding trial rights. The 
first is the prohibition of systematic and intentional exclusion, and the 
second is the need for the jury to be drawn from a fair cross section of 
the community. Yet, these early cases also demonstrate a narrow 
interpretation of these rights. For example, Crawford focused on whether 
or not the selection procedures completely eliminated a specific group 
from representation instead of whether or not the group was 
 
 94.  Id. at 996. 
 95.  Id. at 997 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84–85 (1942)). 
 96.  Id. (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)). 
 97.  Id. (citing Thiel v. Southern P. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Ballard v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192–93 (1946)). 
 98.  Id. (citing Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 99.  Id. at 997–98 & n.27 (“If it appeared that the jury selected for petitioners’ 
trial would not be ‘impartial’ in the constitutional sense because not truly 
representative of the community where petitioners are to be tried, then 
petitioners could make a valid argument that they were not accorded due 
process of law. To require petitioners to be tried by such a jury would not be in 
accord with our traditional conception of substantial fairness and justice.”). 
 100.  Id. at 998–99. 
 101.  Id. at 999. 
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proportionally represented. And, when discussing community 
representativeness, the court used a definition of “community” that 
would not ensure that the actual community where the crime occurred 
was fairly represented. In both Crawford and Bachner the “community” 
was defined as the entire judicial district. In Green, the community to be 
represented was the area where the trial was conducted. 
In Alaska, these definitions of “community” and a focus on total 
exclusion, while seemingly consistent with federal law, meant that jury 
trials for crimes committed in remote Native villages would have jurors 
very dissimilar to the people living in the area where the crime occurred. 
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized and addressed this problem in 
Alvarado v. State.102 Now, systematic exclusion can be shown even 
without absolute exclusion of a specific cognizable group, and the 
community whose representativeness is important is the community 
where the crime or other incident occurred.103 
III. THE LANDMARK HOLDING IN ALVARADO V. STATE 
In Alvarado, the Alaska Supreme Court took a significant leap 
toward ensuring that Alaska Natives would enjoy the constitutional 
guarantee of an impartial jury by officially recognizing that urban jurors 
are not adequate substitutes for villagers in cases involving events 
occurring in Bush Alaska.104 Alvarado was convicted of raping a young 
woman in the Native village of Chignik following a night of village 
celebration at the conclusion of the fishing season.105 He challenged his 
conviction, arguing that the jury selection process used in his trial 
violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury.106 Alvarado had 
been arrested in Chignik and flown approximately 450 miles to 
Anchorage, the designated trial site, where he was arraigned and tried 
in front of a jury summoned from an area within a fifteen-mile radius of 
Anchorage.107 Significant differences existed between Anchorage and 
Chignik. Chignik was a remote Native village with a population of 
about one hundred people, 95% of whom were Alaska Natives.108 
Anchorage was a much larger urban area consisting of only 3.5% Alaska 
 
 102.  486 P.2d 891, 898–99 (Alaska 1971). 
 103.  Id. at 902 & nn.28–29. 
 104.  Id. at 900–01. 
 105.  Id. at 892–93. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 893–94. 
 108.  Id. at 894 & n.4 (defining a “Native village” as a place of twenty-five or 
more persons of whom at least half are Alaska Native). 
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Natives.109 This high percentage of Alaska Natives in a remote village 
population was typical of the judicial district. In fact, while only 10% of 
the total population of the district was Native, 72% of the district’s 
Native population lived in fifty-five villages such as Chignik—only one 
of which was anywhere close to Anchorage.110 Consequently, no Native 
jurors appeared on the panel summoned for Alvarado’s trial.111 
Alvarado challenged the entire jury array because it excluded Native 
villagers, but the trial proceeded and he was convicted.112 
On appeal, Alvarado argued the jury selection process used by the 
Third Judicial District—summoning jurors from the population within 
fifteen miles of Anchorage—precluded residents from Chignik and 
virtually all Native villages within the district, thus violating his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury.113 Extensive testimony was 
taken regarding the vast differences between life in rural villages and 
the larger cities within the state.114 These important differences included 
means of occupation, income levels, economy, domestic relations, 
politics, religion, language, race, cultural heritage, and geography.115 Of 
these differences the court stated: 
The evidence in the record, summarized above, convincingly 
reveals the unique situation which prevails in the third judicial 
district and, indeed, throughout the State of Alaska. This 
evidence vividly portrays the enormous gulf which separates 
the mode of life of the typical Alaskan villager from the type of 
existence led by most residents of Anchorage and other cities of 
the state. The differences between a Native village and the City 
of Anchorage are neither simple nor superficial; they are not 
restricted to a single element such as occupation or income. 
Rather, the lines of separation are profound and intersect areas 
including occupation, economy, domestic relations, politics, 
language, religion, race, cultural heritage, and geography.116 
The court referred to its own prior decisions, decisions from other 
state and federal courts, and decisions from the United States Supreme 
Court, all of which indicated that an impartial jury must be one that is 
drawn from a source that reasonably reflects a cross section of the 
 
 109.  Id. at 895. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 892 n.2. 
 112.  Id. at 893. 
 113.  Id. at 895–96. 
 114.  Id. at 895. 
 115.  Id. at 899–900. 
 116.  Id. at 899. 
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community.117 Defining the proper “community” that must be 
represented became the issue. Facing the reality of the stark differences 
between life in urban and Bush Alaska, the court concluded that 
members of one area cannot be substituted on jury panels for members 
of the other “without substantially impairing the democratic ideal 
inherent in the notion of an impartial jury as an institution representing 
a fair cross section of the community.”118 The community that needs 
representation is the community where the crime occurred.119 
But, an impartial jury is also one that is “not prejudiced by 
knowledge of the events of the specific crime charged.”120 The court 
recognized that in small villages with close familial ties there might be a 
need to expand the jury pool selection area to provide potential jurors 
from outside areas.121 The Legislature had set the outer limits of that 
selection area at the judicial district boundaries, but the court believed 
the selection area should start with the location where the crime 
occurred.122 
The court also noted that using a selection area that does not 
actually include the situs of the crime would also be constitutionally 
sufficient, provided the residents of the selection area share enough 
similar characteristics with the residents where the incident 
transpired.123 If the situs of the crime is excluded, the selection area must 
 
 117.  Id. at 897–99 & n.16 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 
(1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 
333–34 (Alaska 1970); Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1969)). 
 118.  Id. at 900–01. 
 119.  Id. at 902. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See id. at 904 & n.38; see also Knowles, supra note 4, at 250–51. Knowles 
refers to this first requirement of impartiality—the ability of jurors to remain 
unbiased in the pending matter—as narrow impartiality. Id. at 251. Knowles 
refers to the second component of impartiality—the requirement that the panel 
be a fair cross section of the community—as general impartiality. Id. Knowles 
comments on the tension inherent in attempting to achieve both types of 
impartiality. Id. For example, if narrow impartiality in a particular community is 
a concern, then jurors will be sought from a larger geographic area. On the one 
hand, drawing from a larger or different geographic pool will better achieve 
narrow impartiality; on the other hand, it reduces the likelihood, especially in 
Alaska, that the pool will be a fair cross section of the community where the 
crime occurred—a necessity for achieving general impartiality. See id. This 
tension is ever present, and thus courts must do their best to balance it. 
 122.  See Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 901–03 & nn.28–29. The qualifying word 
“should” is used because a careful review of the court’s language and reasoning 
indicates the most appropriate jury pool would always at least include the 
location where the crime occurred. 
 123.  Id. at 902–03. Consider the following statements: 
Because the focus of the concept of community is on the place where 
the offense has allegedly been committed, any narrowing of the area 
MAY.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:40 PM 
2011 IMPARTIAL JURIES FOR RURAL ALASKANS 263 
still reasonably represent “significant elements” of a cross section of the 
community where the offense occurred.124 To illustrate, the court said 
that in the context of Alvarado’s crime, it would have been sufficient to 
draw a jury from residents of Native villages other than Chignik because 
they would constitute a significant element of any conceivable 
community that included Chignik.125 Because Alvarado’s jury was 
drawn from an area that excluded virtually all residents of Native 
villages in the judicial district, the court held that his jury did not 
constitute “a fair cross section of the community in which the crime 
occurred, and that it therefore [was not] impartial.”126 
 
from which prospective jurors are drawn will have no effect on the 
impartiality of jury panels, so long as the narrow area of selection 
continues to include the scene of the crime, and so long as it remains 
sufficiently broad to allow for the empanelment of a jury which is not 
prejudiced by knowledge of the events of the specific crime charged. 
Id. at 902. Read in conjunction with the court’s suggestion that the village, 
election district, or judicial district of Chignik would be the appropriate selection 
areas for a lawful jury pool for a crime committed in Chignik, it is evident that 
the court emphasizes that a selection area should include the actual situs of the 
crime. See id. at 903. In contrast, the court has said: 
Where, on the other hand, prospective jurors are selected from an area 
which does not encompass the scene of the alleged crime, there will 
always be a danger that significant elements of the community in 
which the crime occurred will be excluded from representation on the 
jury panel, and that the panel will consequently fail to represent a fair 
cross section of the community. In such cases, care must be exercised to 
assure that exclusion does not actually occur. 
Id. at 902–03. 
This does not mean that the source of prospective jurors must in all 
instances include residents of the place in which the crime was 
allegedly committed, for it is conceivable that the source of prospective 
jurors may exclude the scene of the alleged offense, yet still reasonably 
represent a cross section of the community which includes the scene of 
the offense. Thus, several decisions imply that selection of prospective 
jurors from a restricted area within a judicial district, even if the scene 
of the crime is omitted from that area, will be acceptable if there is no 
indication that the population of the restricted area differs significantly 
from the population of entire district. 
Id. at 902 n.29 (citing United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. 
denied, 333 U.S. 860 (1948)); see also United States v. Brown, 281 F.Supp. 31 (E.D. 
La. 1968)). But see Knowles, supra note 4, at 256–58 (arguing the use of a “Crime 
Locale Disparity Test,” which includes the location of the crime in the jury pool 
selection area, would often better protect the underlying purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury). 
 124.  Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 902 n.29, 903–904 & n.38. 
 125.  Id. at 903. 
 126.  Id. 
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While creating some vagueness about the need to include the situs 
of the crime in the selection area, Alvarado does make clear that the area 
from which the prospective jurors are selected must not differ 
significantly from the area where the crime occurred.127 Alvarado is a 
landmark decision that helps preserve the essential trial rights of rural 
Alaska Natives. The court recognized the unique and vast difference 
between Native village life and urban life and its impact on community 
representativeness.128 The court emphasized the importance of 
representative juries in our democratic processes in the following 
statement: 
Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors 
by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by 
a representative group are undermining processes weakening 
the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That 
 
 127.  Id. at 902 n.29; see also Tugatuk v. State, 626 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1981). In 
Tugatuk, the same cross section challenge was made in a case with different facts. 
Tugatuk was tried and convicted for multiple counts of murder in an Anchorage 
court for a crime committed in the Eskimo village of Aleknagik. Tugatuk, 626 
P.2d at 97. The trial was moved from Dillingham, the presumptive trial site for 
felonies in Aleknagik, which is approximately seventeen miles away, to 
Anchorage because of Tugatuk’s peremptory challenge of the Dillingham judge. 
Id. at 100. During the empanelling of the jury, Tugatuk’s counsel moved to strike 
the venire because the jury was picked from a thirty-mile radius around 
Anchorage instead of the fifty-mile radius that would presumably have resulted 
in a small number of Alaska Natives on the jury panel. Id. at 98. Looking to 
Alvarado, the court stated that Alvarado’s unconstitutional jury panel resulted 
from the exclusion of virtually all residents of Native villages in that judicial 
district. Id. at 99. The court again reiterated that Alvarado does not mean citizens 
from the town or village in which a crime has occurred will always be included 
in the jury panel, and the ultimate objective is to obtain a jury that is randomly 
selected from a source that reflects a fair cross section of the community in 
which the crime occurred. Id. The court concluded that Tugatuk’s peremptory 
challenge required the removal of the case to Anchorage, thereby waiving his 
right to have his trial jury be a fair cross section of Aleknagik. Id. at 100. 
Nonetheless, Tugatuk was allowed to argue that, “given the fact that he lives in 
a rural village which was the setting of the crime, a fair cross section of the 
community for a trial held in Anchorage must include ample representation of 
the rural Alaskan life-style discussed in Alvarado.” Id. Because Tugatuk failed to 
provide statistics showing that the number of occupants of Native villages 
included in his jury venire was not reasonably representative of such persons, 
his constitutional claim failed. See id. at 101. For another example of a court 
conducting a similar analysis, see Lestenkof v. State, 229 P.3d 182, 184 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 2010), which held that the trial of a crime occurring in Saint Paul was 
properly moved to Dillingham because too many persons in the Saint Paul area 
had personal knowledge of the crime or were related to the parties, and 
Dillingham had a high number of Alaska Natives and shared enough similar 
characteristics with life in Saint Paul. 
 128.  See Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 902 (“It is the community in which the crime 
was committed that the jury must represent.”). 
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the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best 
must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment 
whatsoever on this essential right. Steps innocently taken may 
one by one lead to the irretrievable impairment of substantial 
liberties.129 
Finally, the court recommended the development of jury selection 
alternatives despite the increased financial burden to the state.130 
IV. THE STATE’S EFFORTS TO COMPLY WITH ALVARADO 
The State of Alaska no longer uses a narrow fifteen-mile radius 
from the trial site to summon trial jurors. Alaska Rule of Administration 
15(c) requires juries to be selected from a list of qualified jurors residing 
within fifty miles of the trial location, unless doing so cannot produce a 
fair cross section of the area where the offense occurred or it would 
create unreasonable travel expenses.131 This expanded selection radius 
increases the likelihood of collecting a fair cross section of the various 
communities within the judicial district where crimes have occurred. 
However, selecting juries from within fifty miles of Alaska’s urban trial 
sites does not ensure that the jury pool will be reflective of Native 
villages. For example, there are no remote Native villages within fifty 
miles of Fairbanks. Therefore, Alvarado also led to the creation of Alaska 
Criminal Rule 18, which is another attempt to ensure jury 
representativeness.132 
Rule 18 increases the number of trial sites spread throughout the 
judicial districts so that trials can be conducted in settings with jury 
pools more likely to mirror rural communities. The Rule establishes a 
venue map that shows the various district and superior court venue 
districts within the larger judicial districts.133 This venue map includes a 
helpful chart that lists each community appearing on the map along 
 
 129.  Id. at 904 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)). 
 130.  Id. at 905 (“No matter what the amount, however, we do not think that it 
would justify the perpetuation of a system which denies to a large segment of 
our citizens the opportunity to participate in our system of justice.”). 
 131.   ALASKA RULES OF ADMIN. 15(c). For Alaska’s jury standards for grand 
jury and civil and criminal trials, see ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.20.010–090 (2010), 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.010 (2010), and ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.010 (2010). 
 132.  See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18; John v. State, 35 P.3d 53, 55–56 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2001) (discussing the purpose and operation of the rule); see also Knowles, 
supra note 4, at 249–50 (providing a description of Alaska Criminal Rule 18 and 
its impact on jury selection). 
 133.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(a); Alaska Venue Map, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM (Oct. 
14, 2011), http://www.state.ak.us/courts/venuemapinfo.htm. 
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with each community’s presumptive trial site.134 While cases are initially 
assigned to a presumptive trial site, they can be transferred as a matter 
of right to an approved alternative trial site within the venue district that 
is nearest to the site where the crime occurred.135 To transfer to another 
trial site, the defendant must request the transfer within ten days of 
entering a plea; if the defendant does not request a transfer within ten 
days, the right is deemed waived.136 In addition, Rule 18(f) allows the 
court or parties to request a change in the fifty-mile jury selection area 
established by Administrative Rule 15(c) if it can be shown that a fair 
cross section of the community cannot be obtained.137 
Neither Rule is specific about how subsection (f) is to be applied, 
but an examination of the rules reveals three options. First, a trial could 
be moved to a different community where the selection area is believed 
to be more representative than the alternative trial site identified by 
Criminal Rule 18. This was the approach taken by the superior court in 
Lestenkof v. State,138 even though persons from the community where the 
crime occurred were ultimately not included in the jury pool selection 
area.139 Second, the court could supplement the standard list of potential 
jurors by simply expanding the fifty-mile selection radius to draw in 
potential jurors living a little farther from the presumptive or alternative 
trial site. This approach was considered but rejected by the trial court in 
Lestenkof because of the expense of chartering in an entire flight from a 
neighboring island.140 This approach would still include the community 
of the offense in the selection area and faithfully follow the spirit of 
Alvarado and the idea of vicinage. Third, the court could transport in a 
special venire gathered from an area that does not include the 
community where the crime occurred but is deemed sufficiently 
 
 134.  Alaska Venue Map, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/venuemapinfo.htm; Chart of Communities on 
Alaska Court System Venue Map, ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, 
http://courts.alaska.gov/sco/sco1645a.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 135.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(b), (e). 
 136.  Id. 18(e). 
 137.  Id. 18(f). Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(g) indicates that outside 
of venue transfers made for jury representativeness concerns, venue decisions 
shall be determined under the standards set forth in section 22.10.040 of the 
Alaska Statutes. Id. 18(g). For an example of the application of this statute, see 
Dana v. State, 623 P.2d 348, 351–52 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981), which explains that 
when change of venue is requested because of alleged cultural and social 
differences between the place of trial and the place where the offense occurred, 
the defendant has the burden of establishing the systematic exclusion of a 
distinct group or class of persons from the jury unless venue is changed. 
 138.  229 P.3d 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
 139.  Id. at 189. 
 140.  See id. at 185. 
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representative of that location. This approach is arguably allowable 
under the standards set forth in Alvarado, but it would be the most 
expensive option. 
V. IMPROPER APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL RULE 18 
Criminal Rule 18 and Administrative Rule 15(c) increase the 
opportunity for many Alaska Natives to have their trials held closer to 
home and heard by jurors more reflective of their communities. But 
deficiencies remain. Under current selection practices, not all rural 
communities are regularly included in jury selection pools because they 
are not located within fifty miles of any court.141 This limits the ability of 
these rural residents to participate in this important democratic process 
and decreases the likelihood that defendants from these areas will be 
judged by persons from their communities.142 
Rather than adopting selection practices that focus on proximity to 
the location of the crime, the State continues to focus on proximity to the 
trial site.143 But, the State’s adoption of Criminal Rule 18 expands the 
number of available alternative trial sites that are closer to the more 
remote areas. Some contend this approach fails to adhere to the spirit of 
Alvarado because it continues to exclude the actual remote community 
where the crime occurred in the jury selection area for many trials.144 
 
 141. See Knowles, supra note 4, at 259. For example, the village of Eagle is 
more than fifty miles from its presumptive trial site in Tok, and there are no 
approved alternative trial sites that are closer. See Alaska Venue Map, ALASKA 
COURT SYSTEM (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/venuemapinfo.htm 
 142.  See Knowles, supra note 4, at 247–48. Knowles believes the court system 
fails to ensure an impartial jury for all rural Alaskans because the unique 
composition and placement of these villages precludes their involvement in the 
state justice system. See id. at 248. However, Knowles fails to discuss the 
implications of the last “catch-all” subsection of Criminal Rule 18, which allows 
the court to designate an alternative jury pool if the sites identified under 
subsections (a)–(e) do not provide a pool with a representative cross section. See 
id. at 248–60. Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(f) allows potential jury 
participation of members in communities outside normal selection areas when a 
demonstrable need is brought before the court, even though these same rural 
community members may not be regularly called upon. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 
18(f). 
 143.  See ALASKA RULES OF ADMIN. 15(b)–(c). 
 144.  See Knowles, supra note 4, at 251–60 for a detailed argument of how, 
even as of 2005, jury selection practices fail to empanel impartial juries in many 
instances because the area of comparison is too broad to account for the 
individualized character of many remote villages. Knowles advocates for the use 
of a different selection standard dubbed the “Crime Locale Disparity Test” to 
better serve the underlying purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 252, 256–60. 
Knowles contends that Alaska’s selection procedures, with the aid of Criminal 
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Rather than addressing that perceived deficiency, this Article highlights 
an even more glaring problem specific to how Criminal Rule 18 is 
currently administered. 
Criminal Rule 18(e)’s waiver provision is being unconstitutionally 
applied in a passive manner. The Rule seeks to avoid jury impartiality 
challenges by creating alternatives and shifting the responsibility of 
accessing these alternatives to the defendant.145 If the defendant does not 
request an alternative trial site under subsection (e) or the use of 
alternative selection procedures available under subsection (f) within ten 
days of his arraignment, the options are waived.146 Nothing ensures the 
defendant has been informed of his responsibility to affirmatively 
request a change of venue or jury selection area. A passive waiver 
provision is unconstitutional because waivers of crucial trial rights must 
be knowing and intelligent.147 
In Joseph v. State,148 the Alaska Court of Appeals recently addressed 
whether a defendant can waive his trial venue rights available under 
Criminal Rule 18 if he is never aware venue options existed.149 This is a 
matter of first impression in Alaska,150 and because the court opted to 
issue a memorandum decision instead of a binding reported decision, 
the matter is still somewhat up in the air.151 In Joseph, the court held that 
“[t]he decision about where a criminal defendant’s jury trial should be 
held is not one of the decisions over which the client has the ultimate 
authority.”152 Thus, it is not a violation of due process of law if a trial 
attorney makes the decision of whether or not to change venue under 
Criminal Rule 18 and never informs the rural client of the options 
available.153 
 
Rule 18, satisfy the federal constitutional standards for a fair cross section under 
the standard applied in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), but still fall short 
of accomplishing the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 251–60. 
 145.  See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(e). 
 146.  Id. 18(e)–(f). 
 147.  See Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235–41 (1973) (discussing 
in detail several cases which require a knowing relinquishment of trial rights for 
a waiver of the trial rights to be considered voluntary). 
 148.  No. A-9675, 2011 WL 182048 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2011) 
(memorandum opinion). 
 149.  Id. at *3. 
 150.  Joseph v. State, No. 4FA-05-01078 CI, at 7 (Alaska Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 
2008) (memorandum decision and order granting State’s motion for summary 
judgment).  
 151.  See ALASKA R. APP. P. 214(d); see also Guidelines for Publication of Court 
of Appeals Decisions ¶ 7 (Court of Appeals Order No. 3) (articulating that 
memorandum decisions do not create legal precedent and may not be cited as 
binding authority for a proposition of law). 
 152.  Joseph, 2011 WL 182048, at *3. 
 153.  Id. 
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Joseph was convicted of murdering his girlfriend in the small 
Native village of Rampart, which is located approximately ninety air 
miles from Fairbanks, the presumptive felony trial site where he was 
convicted following a jury trial.154 At the time of the murder in 2003, 
Rampart consisted of about twenty-one people, 91% of whom were 
Alaska Native.155 Fairbanks’ 2003 estimated population was 29,486, 
13.3% of whom were Alaska Native.156 Alaska Natives comprised 9.9% 
of the Fairbanks North Star Borough’s population.157 Joseph’s jury was 
selected from persons living within a fifty-mile radius of Fairbanks,158 
which does not encompass any remote Native villages. Criminal Rule 18 
designated Nenana—a small town whose population is roughly one-half 
Alaska Native—as an available alternative trial site.159 Nenana is not 
within the Fairbanks jury selection area, and a jury trial conducted in 
Nenana would have selected jurors from within fifty miles of Nenana 
instead of Fairbanks.160 Trial location alternatives and jury selection 
implications were never communicated to Joseph by his attorney.161 
Upon learning of this option, Joseph sought post-conviction relief, 
arguing that his trial violated his due process rights.162 The court of 
appeals disagreed, relying heavily upon Alaska Professional Conduct 
Rule 1.2(a) and Simeon v. State.163 Alaska Professional Conduct Rule 
1.2(a) states that “in a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial, whether the client will testify, and whether 
to take an appeal.”164 Simeon held that “[Professional Conduct Rule 1.2] 
specifies clearly those decisions over which the client has the ultimate 
authority. Since the rule limits the client’s authority to those decisions, it 
follows that the lawyer has the ultimate authority to make other 
decisions governing trial tactics.”165 
 
 154.  See id. at *1. 
 155.  Joseph, No. 4FA-05-01078 CI, at 3. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 4. 
 159.  See Joseph, 2011 WL 182048, at *1 (citing ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 18(e)). 
 160.  See id.; ALASKA RULES OF ADMIN. 15(b)–(c). 
 161.  See Joseph, 2011 WL 182048, at *1. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See id. at *3.   
 164.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(a). 
 165.  Simeon v. State, 90 P.3d 181, 184 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). Simeon 
identifies five decisions as personal to the defendant, and these decisions may 
not be made by the defendant’s attorney. These decisions are: (1) the right to 
choose which plea to enter; (2) whether to accept a plea offer; (3) whether to 
testify; (4) whether to waive a jury trial; and (5) whether or not to appeal. Id. at 
183. 
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The fundamental decisions identified in Professional Conduct Rule 
1.2 as personal to a criminal defendant can be contrasted with decisions 
that have been left to the sound discretion of trial counsel: whether to 
request lesser-included offenses,166 whether to petition for review,167 
whether to make an opening statement,168 whether to cross-examine a 
victim,169 whether to present an alibi defense,170 and whether certain 
issues should be raised on appeal.171 These latter decisions are 
important, but not nearly as integrally connected to the concept of a fair 
criminal trial as the ones listed in Alaska Professional Conduct Rule 
1.2(a). 
The question is whether the right to move a trial to a closer 
alternative site under Criminal Rule 18 falls more closely in line with the 
decisions enumerated in Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 or with the more 
technical decisions that fall upon the attorney to make. In situations 
where community representativeness and corresponding impartiality 
are not at issue, venue decisions are tactical decisions made by attorneys 
to capitalize on a perceived trial advantage. In the context of a rural 
Bush villager being tried by persons unfamiliar with his culture and 
social mores, the venue decision becomes integrally connected to 
whether or not he is afforded a fair trial. 
It is understandable how Alaska Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) 
and Simeon v. State could have influenced the trial and appellate courts’ 
holdings. However, contrary authority exists that suggests decisions of 
this magnitude are personal to the defendant. 
In Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte,172 a case one would not normally look 
to for guidance regarding jury impartiality, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed some fundamental concepts governing waivers of 
constitutional rights. The central issue in Schneckcloth was whether 
consent to search for evidence is voluntary if it is not preceded by actual 
knowledge of the right to refuse a law enforcement officer’s request.173 
The Court’s reasoning includes information germane to waivers of 
Criminal Rule 18. Consent is closely connected with the concept of 
waiver. 
 
 166.  Id. at 184. 
 167.  Smith v. State, 185 P.3d 767, 769 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 168.  Gorz v. State, 749 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Pease, 163 P.3d 985 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 169.  Strehl v. State, 722 P.2d 226, 228 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 170.  Monroe v. State, 752 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
 171.  Tucker v. State, 892 P.2d 832, 836–37 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 172.  412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 173.  Id. at 223. 
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In Schneckcloth, police had stopped a vehicle for equipment 
violations and then asked for consent to search the vehicle for other 
criminal evidence; the occupants of the vehicle were never told that they 
could refuse the request.174 The Court was asked to decide whether 
actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a prerequisite to 
voluntary consent when officers ask for consent to search for 
evidence.175 At the time, the California courts held that it was not an 
absolute requirement and just one of many factors that must be assessed 
in determining voluntariness, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
disagreed.176 The United States Supreme Court sided with the view of 
the California courts and held that the question of whether consent to 
search is voluntary, as opposed to the product of duress or coercion, is a 
factual question that must be determined by looking at all the 
circumstances, and actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a 
factor in this determination but not an absolute prerequisite to finding 
effective consent.177 
In deciding the issue, the Court expounded on the standards for 
voluntary waivers of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights. It 
demonstrated that, unlike Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections, 
Sixth Amendment protections integrally connected with a fair trial 
cannot be waived absent a knowing and intelligent decision.178 The 
requirements for a voluntary waiver depend upon the situation and 
what is being waived.179 There are differing lines of cases governing 
waivers of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment protections, and these 
cases demonstrate that waivers integrally connected with Sixth 
Amendment trial rights must be preceded by actual knowledge of the 
right.180 
Fifth Amendment confession cases indicate, with the exception of 
statements made in response to custodial interrogation,181 a statement 
 
 174.  Id. at 220–21. 
 175.  Id. at 223. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 227. 
 178.  Id. at 235–41 (effective waivers of constitutional rights must be 
“voluntary,” a requirement that reflects a fair accommodation of the 
constitutional rights involved and the interests of the government in effective 
criminal detection and prosecution). 
 179.  Id. at 224–25, 229 (discussing the competing interests in both confession 
and consent search situations). 
 180.  Id. at 224, 235–36, 241–45. 
 181.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966). Because of the inherent 
psychologically coercive atmosphere that permeates custodial interrogations, an 
affirmative appraisal of constitutional rights is required. Waivers of protections 
afforded by the Fifth Amendment during custodial interrogation must be 
knowing and intelligent. Id. at 460–66. 
MAY.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  5:40 PM 
272 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 28:2 
made in response to police questioning can be voluntary even if the 
confessor was not affirmatively apprised of the constitutional right to 
remain silent.182 Similarly, the Court reasoned that, in the Fourth 
Amendment search context, requiring officers to affirmatively inform 
suspects of their right to refuse consent in a non-custodial fact 
investigation weighs too heavily against legitimate law enforcement 
interests.183  
Schneckcloth bolstered its reasoning by contrasting waivers of 
Fourth Amendment rights with waivers of Sixth Amendment trial 
rights.184 Waivers of trial rights afforded under the Sixth Amendment 
are wholly different and so is the requirement for a voluntary waiver.185 
A stricter standard requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver has been 
applied to rights connected with the trial process.186 These rights are 
guaranteed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be 
accorded the greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet 
of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial. Any trial 
conducted in derogation of that model leaves open the 
possibility that the trial reached an unfair result precisely 
because all the protections specified in the Constitution were 
not provided. . . . The Constitution requires that every effort be 
made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case has not 
unknowingly relinquished the basic protections that the 
Framers thought indispensable to a fair trial.187 
In Johnson v. Zerbst188 the United States Supreme Court declared 
that a voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
requires proof of an “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege.”189 In Schneckcloth, the Court noted the 
heightened waiver standard announced in Johnson underscores the 
importance of constitutional safeguards surrounding a fair criminal trial; 
the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed to protect the fairness 
of trials and the reliability of the process.190 To preserve the fairness of 
 
 182.  Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 226–27. A review of these cases showed that 
voluntariness turns on whether or not the will of the defendant was overborne, 
and several factors surrounding the characteristics of the accused and the details 
of the police questioning are relevant. Id. 
 183.  Id. at 230–33. 
 184.  Id. at 236. 
 185.  Id. at 236, 241. 
 186.  Id. at 241. 
 187.  Id. at 241–42. 
 188.  304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 189.  Id. at 464. 
 190.  Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 235; see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462–63 (“The 
Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional 
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the trial process, Johnson establishes the “appropriately heavy burden” 
on the government to demonstrate an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right or privilege.191 This requirement of a knowing waiver has 
been applied to many rights associated with the trial process, such as 
waiver of the assistance of counsel at trial or arraignment, waiver of the 
right to confrontation of witnesses, waiver of a jury trial, waiver of a 
speedy trial, and waiver of double jeopardy protections.192 Additionally, 
this heightened waiver requirement is required in other trial-like 
situations such as hearings before administrative agencies, congressional 
committees, and juvenile proceedings.193 Schneckcloth even goes on to 
note that the elevated standard of knowing and intelligent waiver 
extends to pretrial rights that are connected to the trial itself. For 
example, post-indictment lineups are considered a critical stage of the 
criminal prosecution, requiring the presence of counsel or a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of that right.194 Even the decision to require 
affirmative efforts to inform detained suspects of their constitutional 
rights prior to custodial interrogation in Miranda v. Arizona was 
premised upon the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself.195 
Jury impartiality is inseparably connected with the right to a jury 
trial itself. In Alvarado v. State the Alaska Supreme Court declared the 
necessity for juries to be a fair cross section of the community where the 
crime occurred cannot be overemphasized.196 The court stated: 
 
safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’ It embodies a 
realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not 
have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a 
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is 
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, 
and necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained layman may appear intricate, 
complex and mysterious.”). 
 191.  Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 236–37; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464. 
 192.  Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 237–38. 
 193.  Id. at 238. 
 194.  Id. at 239 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967); Gilbert 
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967)). 
 195.  Id. at 240 (“That counsel is present when statements are taken from an 
individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the fact-
finding processes in court. The presence of an attorney, and the warnings 
delivered to the individual, enable the defendant under otherwise compelling 
circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that 
eliminates the evils in the interrogation process. Without the protections flowing 
from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, all the careful safeguards 
erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other 
witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most 
compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been 
obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.” (quoting Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966) (internal quotations omitted))). 
 196.  486 P.2d 891, 903–04 (Alaska 1971). 
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The jury is an essential institution in our democracy, and serves 
multifaceted purposes. It is, of course, primarily charged with 
the task of finding the truth of the facts asserted. Yet beyond its 
utility as a finder of fact, the jury fulfills other equally vital 
political and psychological purposes. In Green v. State, we had 
occasion to note the jury’s role as a safeguard against the 
possibility of governmental tyranny and oppression. We stated 
there:  
As a protection or barrier against the exercise of 
arbitrary power, the people of this state, in adopting 
our constitution, guaranteed to petitioners the right to 
be tried by ‘an impartial jury of twelve.’ 
As an institution, the jury offers our citizens the opportunity to 
participate in the workings of our government, and serves to 
legitimize our system of justice in the eyes of both the public 
and the accused. 
  The jury, like the right to vote, is fundamentally preservative 
of ideals which are essential to our democratic system. When 
the impartiality of jurors is neglected, ‘(t)he injury is not limited 
to the defendant—there is injury to the jury system, to the law 
as an institution, to the community at large, and to the 
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.’ For 
this reason, we must be ever militant to protect the notion of 
our juries as bodies truly representative of the community. The 
admonition of the United States Supreme Court in Glasser v. 
United States must faithfully be heeded: 
Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the 
selection of jurors by any method other than a process 
which will insure a trial by a representative group are 
undermining processes weakening the institution of 
jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That the 
motives influencing such tendencies may be of the 
best must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any 
encroachment whatsoever on this essential right. 
Steps innocently taken may one by one lead to the 
irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.197 
That is strong language calling for vigilant protection of trial rights. 
If the court system wishes to honor the Alaska and United States 
Constitutions it must ensure that the right to an impartial jury is a 
personal trial right of the defendant. Since an impartial jury is a 
 
 197.  Id. at 903–04 (internal citations omitted). 
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fundamental constitutional trial right198 and the Alaska Supreme Court 
has recognized that this cannot be achieved unless the community 
where the crime occurred is fairly represented in the jury pool,199 the 
court must honor this right by ensuring defendants are apprised of this 
right prior to accepting a waiver of the right. Absent actual knowledge 
of the right, such waiver should be ineffective. Criminal Rule 18 is 
flawed because it does not treat the right to request a change of venue as 
a right personal to the defendant. Rather, this is a decision left to defense 
counsel200—a person who does not possess the right to an impartial jury. 
VI. SOLUTION 
A relatively simple and effective solution is within reach. During 
his or her initial court appearance, a defendant is informed of the 
information in the charging documents and told about several 
fundamental trial rights, such as the right to retain counsel and the right 
to not make a statement at that time.201 Some defendants are arraigned 
during the initial appearance, but others are scheduled for a later time.202 
When a defendant is arraigned, the court confirms the accuracy of the 
defendant’s name and personal information, explains some basic trial 
rights, explains the plea process and the meanings of various plea 
options, and explains the parameters of the possible punishments for 
conviction of the charged offense.203 Many of these rights are explained 
in a video produced by the Alaska Court System that is shown to 
defendants as part of the arraignment process. Regardless of when it 
occurs, the arraignment presents an opportune time for the court to tell 
the defendant about Criminal Rule 18. 
The court system should include a brief statement regarding 
Criminal Rule 18 in the video and/or make this part of their oral 
explanation of rights to individual defendants who are arraigned. The 
statement could go as follows: 
Alaska is a large state with many remote communities. To 
ensure citizens the right to an impartial jury reflective of the 
community where the events occurred, Criminal Rule 18 allows 
defendants charged with committing crimes in remote settings 
 
 198.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ALASKA CONST. art I, § 11; Green v. State, 462 
P.2d 994, 997 (Alaska 1969). 
 199.   Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 899, 902. 
 200.  See Joseph v. State, No. A-9675, 2011 WL 182048, at *3 (Alaska Ct App. 
2011) (memorandum opinion). 
 201.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 10–11. 
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to request their trial be conducted in an available alternative 
location closer to that area. If an alternative location is not 
available, or the change still does not create a representative 
jury pool, defendants can request other alternative measures be 
taken to ensure that the jury reflects the location of the crime. 
Failure to request these options within ten days results in a 
forfeiture of these rights. 
This statement addresses a procedural hole and helps honor rural 
Alaskans’ constitutional trial rights. Providing actual notice to criminal 
defendants places an increased burden upon the courts, but it is a 
burden that they should appropriately bear. It is patently unfair and 
contrary to our notion of impartial judgment to subject remote Native 
villagers to trials where the jury has little understanding of village life, 
including the communication, cultural, and environmental norms. It is 
equally unfair to create rules designed to eliminate this occurrence but 
then fail to ensure defendants know about them before deeming them 
waived. 
CONCLUSION 
The desire to be judged by similarly situated persons is indicative 
of one of our intrinsic notions of justice: we should be judged by those 
who share various characteristics with us. The United States Supreme 
Court has warned of the slippery slope we embark upon when subtle 
encroachments into constitutional rights are allowed to continue: 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices 
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches 
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can 
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional 
provisions for the security of person and property should be 
liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives 
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of 
the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is 
the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of 
the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.204 
This Article highlights some of the history of jury selection 
practices in Alaska. Early challenges to selection practices were 
 
 204.  Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1973) (quoting Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, (1886), overruled on other grounds by Warden, 
Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294 (1967)). 
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unsuccessful because Alaska seemingly followed federal precedent to 
ensure that systematic exclusion of certain groups did not occur and that 
there was some level of community representation.205 This narrow view 
of impartiality worked injustice on rural Alaska Natives. The Alaska 
Supreme Court recognized that the vast differences between remote 
Native villages and urban centers made it impossible for juries 
comprised of one of these groups to reflect juries made of the other.206 
The court declared that the community that must be represented is the 
community where the crime took place.207 
Criminal Rule 18 seeks to ensure this occurs by allowing rural 
defendants the opportunity to move their trials to alternative sites closer 
to the location of the crime. If this option is not available or the venue 
transfer still will not draw a jury that is sufficiently representative of the 
community where the crime occurred, the Rule also allows the court to 
expand the jury pool selection area to draw in persons who are more 
reflective of that community. These options are forfeited if the defendant 
does not request the changes within ten days of arraignment. 
It is reasonable to assume that many criminal defense attorneys fail 
to apprise their rural clients of this fundamental trial right. Furthermore, 
many defendants who choose to represent themselves are likely to be 
unaware of Criminal Rule 18. Waivers of fundamental constitutional 
trial rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The rights 
available under Criminal Rule 18 are personal to the defendant, and the 
court system should, as it does with other personal rights, affirmatively 
apprise criminal defendants of these trial rights for the waiver to have 
valid effect. 
 
 
 205.  See supra Part II. 
 206.  Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 900–01 (Alaska 1971). 
 207.  Id. at 902. 
